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ABSTRACT
In 1775, the South Carolina Council of Safety and Provincial Congress faced the 
tall order of convincing backcountry settlers to join them in overthrowing royal 
government. Throughout the backcountry, enthusiasm for independence ran low. The 
lack of revolutionary zeal was a consequence of political, economic, and social 
differences between the backcountry and the lowcountry. Political power was 
concentrated in Charleston and the lowcountry. The backcountry lacked representation in 
the colonial Assembly, courts to prosecute criminals, and the Anglican establishment 
necessary to establishing a deferential social order. Economically, backcountry farmers 
were unable to replicate the rice plantations of the lowcountry. Without profits from a 
staple-crop such as rice, an egalitarian social order developed in the backcountry. Certain 
historians have argued that the influence of prominent individuals within the 
backcountry, who shared economic interests with coastal planters, helped to rally the 
backcountry to independence. Without strong political institutions and a staple-crop 
economy, deference failed to take root, undermining the arguments of these historians.
In light of the differences between the two regions, revolutionary allegiances were 
not forged on a common ideology. How then did the Whig government secure the 
backcountry? The answer is two-fold and centers on the issue of protection. While the 
Whigs faced open opposition from back-settlers, the backcountry was subdued through 
threats of violence. The Council of Safety and Provincial Congress used militia forces to 
suppress political dissent in addition to waging economic warfare against those opposed 
to the independence movement. Rather than take up arms as active loyalists, most 
individuals chose to preserve their property by acquiescing to Whig rule. Whig forces 
also benefited from a major strategic blunder on the part of the British. Fear of Indian 
attacks ran high in the backcountry, and though the British had no intention of using the 
Indians to attack the colony, their actions sparked suspicion. While British intentions 
remained unclear to back-settlers, Whig forces sacked the Cherokees in 1776, securing 
the allegiance of thousands of back-settlers in the process. In 1780, thousands of back- 
settlers took up arms under the guard of British troops, reinforcing the notion that 
allegiance was based on protection and not political ideology.
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INTRODUCTION
When Thomas Brown regained full consciousness on the evening of August 2, 
1775, he probably awoke with a splitting headache. A strong blow from a rifle to the back 
of his skull had left Brown semiconscious. Just hours before he had been confronting a 
hostile mob from the porch of a plantation house deep within the Georgia backcountry. 
The headaches Brown would suffer for the rest of his life were not the only permanent 
wound he carried with him as a result of the confrontation. Brown’s feet had sustained 
severe trauma from exposure to a fire, crippling two toes and forcing him to walk with a 
limp for several months. Had his hand reached up to touch his head, he would have found 
a raw, open wound. If the blow to his head had clouded Brown’s memory, he may have 
assumed that Creek Indians had claimed his scalp; but his legs revealed the true identity 
of his assailants. A thick layer of tar caked his lower extremities, the signature 
punishment for those who opposed the will of the revolutionary m ob.1
In the aftermath of the attack, Brown fled Georgia for the Ninety-Six district of 
the South Carolina backcountry to join forces with prominent loyalists. The angry mob 
that appeared at his door demanded that he sign an association swearing allegiance to the
1 Edward J. Cashin, The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on 
the Southern Frontier (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 27-29. Though 
Brown settled in Georgia, he became a staunch loyalist and traveled extensively 
throughout South Carolina seeking to rally back-settlers for the Crown. His experience is 
similar to those who opposed Whig rule in South Carolina and thus is used as an example 
here.
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Whig government. Brown had arrived in the colony less than a year before the attack, but 
he immediately entered a polarized society. As a new immigrant, he lacked the hatred of 
British policies that had been brewing for ten years among many colonists. Yet the angry 
mob that appeared at his door did not seek conciliatory gestures or afford him the option 
of neutrality. He was either with them or against them.
Brown’s mistreatment at the hands of the Whigs spurred him to become a 
prominent loyalist leader, the commander of a provincial regiment known as the King’s 
Rangers, and Indian Superintendent for the Southern Department late in the war. Though 
the abuse Brown received at the hands of the Whigs was uncommon for most 
backcountry settlers, each backcountry resident was confronted with a choice: patriot or 
loyalist, associator or non-associator; there was no in-between. In the political and social 
turbulence of 1775, a year that witnessed the fall of royal government and open conflict 
between neighbors throughout South Carolina, the decisions made by tens of thousands 
of backcountry settlers determined the fate of the Revolution in South Carolina.
What makes the backcountry settler in South Carolina different from any other 
individual in any other colony who would participate in the war? The settlement of the 
South Carolina backcountry occurred mere decades before the outbreak of the 
Revolution. Though the backcountry was slowly moving towards integration with the 
coastal establishment, the war interrupted the process. Economically, politically, and 
socially, the backcountry differed from the sophisticated, wealthy, Anglicized society it 
bordered. As a result, the Whig government encountered opposition as it attempted to 
rally the backcountry to war. Given the lowcountry’s record of political indifference 
towards the backcountry and the economic differences between the two regions, many
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men had no desire to exchange a peaceful way of life and recently acquired economic 
stability for the havoc brought by war. Local concerns such as preventing the next Indian 
attack, getting the next crop to market, and establishing schools dominated the minds of 
the back-inhabitants, not abstract issues concerning a Parliament three thousand miles 
away.
This description of the backcountry directly challenges that of Rachel Klein, who 
downplays the sectional divide between the two regions by attacking the notion of the 
backcountry as an egalitarian frontier. According to Klein, the backcountry was not 
isolated because a rising planter elite within the backcountry, who wielded a great deal of 
power in their localities, shared common economic interests with the planter elite in the 
South Carolina lowcountry. While the fact that that the vast majority of these rising 
planters took up arms for the Whigs is well-known, Klein goes further by arguing that 
lesser men of property followed their example. Her study, however, exaggerates the 
strength of deference in the backcountry and consequently, she gives the rising planter 
elite too much agency. In 1775 and 1776, deference had no bearing on the breakdown of 
allegiances for the vast majority of the white backcountry population. As mentioned 
above, the social, political, and economic conditions within the backcountry served as an 
obstacle to revolution. Yet, by the time the Declaration of Independence was signed, the 
Whigs controlled the entire province. If individuals did not defer to their Whig-leaning 
local leaders, how did the Whig government come to control the backcountry?
The Whig government employed intimidation tactics, threats of physical harm, 
the seizure or destruction of property, and economic warfare to neutralize those opposed 
to the revolutionary cause and to prevent the wavering from joining the opposition.
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Violence was necessary because of the lack of ideological unity between the two regions, 
a result of differing political, economic, and social conditions. The Whig government 
conquered the backcountry in 1775 and early 1776 because the average backcountry 
settler sought something that loyalist and British forces could not offer: protection. 
Assessing why certain people chose one side over the other uncovers a variety of 
motivations, but protection, more than any other factor, allowed the Whigs to gain control 
of the backcountry and to neutralize the threat posed by loyalists. Without British troops 
to protect them, most backcountry settlers chose the path of least resistance and accepted 
Whig rule. When the British invaded in 1780, many of these same settlers would seek 
protection from the British army, reinforcing the idea that allegiance was not based on 
ideology.
The Whigs were also aided in their efforts by a major strategic error on the part of 
the British. While the Whigs attacked the Cherokee Indians in 1776, the bitter enemy of 
the backcountry settlers, the British sought to ally with the Cherokees and their Creek 
neighbors. Though the British did not intend to employ the Indians in a military 
campaign against the Whigs, the fears of back-settlers, who had endured Indian attacks in 
the past, compelled them to join the side that provided protection against future attacks.
Assessing the motivation of such an ethnically and religiously diverse population 
is no easy task and generalizations pervade the analysis. Such is the nature of the 
scholarship on the South Carolina backcountry. Historians have embarked upon 
specialized studies due to the ethnic and religious diversity of the region; this study, 
however, focuses on a single factor that can bridge these divides. Protection is a basic
4
human instinct; ethnic or religious differences have little bearing on the need to secure 
life and property.
Regardless of whether the study is a synthesis or highly specialized, both are 
plagued with source difficulties. In the aftermath of the war, thousands lay dead, while 
thousands of others fled the colony to escape Whig persecution, leaving behind precious 
little documentation describing why they remained loyal to the Crown. With their former 
enemies gone, the victors wrote a triumphant history of the war, disparaging or excluding 
the group that nearly thwarted their cause. The lack of written evidence complicates 
efforts to reconstruct the backcountry experience on the eve of Revolution. A definitive, 
conclusive answer may never be found. This study seeks to use the preconditions of the 
war as a means to infer the motives of individuals in choosing sides. Though no records 
exist to shed light on the decision-making process of a backcountry yeoman farmer, a 
wealth of information left behind from both Whigs and royal officials exists. When 
coupled with knowledge of what backcountry life was like on the eve of Revolution, 
these sources can help explain how the Whigs won control of the backcountry.
In hindsight, the fate of the Revolution in South Carolina was decided in 1775 and 
1776. The fall of royal government and the transition to Whig administration created an 
opportunity for loyalists to assert themselves. Loyalist numbers peaked in 1775. By 1780, 
when the British attempted a full-scale invasion and occupation of the colony, the Whig 
government had rooted out and exiled prominent loyalists such as Thomas Brown. The 
rest remained in hiding, afraid to declare their allegiance unless the British offered them 
protection. At the front of their minds was an ill-conceived and poorly executed British 
expedition in 1776 under the command of Sir Henry Clinton. The rebels thwarted the
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British attack, which bolstered their confidence and struck a blow to loyalist hopes. The 
British military offered the only safety from Whig oppression. Had Sir William Howe 
sent his army to Charleston instead of New York City in 1776, royal government might 
have been restored and back-settlers afforded the protection they sought. Loyalist militias 
rose up on their own in 1775 to prevent the entrenchment of Whig authority, but they 
would not stand up again unless the British could guarantee protection. When the British 
returned in 1780, they once again failed to offer the necessary protection and facilitated a 
civil war.
Any study of revolutionary allegiances, regardless of the colony, must examine 
the economic, political, and social conditions of the years leading to the Revolution. In 
South Carolina, these conditions had a major influence on determining allegiance as the 
war approached. Thus, an analysis of backcountry life serves as the point of departure for 
this study.
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CHAPTER I
LIFE IN THE BACKCOUNTRY
Throughout the 18th century, tens of thousands of settlers left their lands in the 
backwoods of Pennsylvania to travel south along the Philadelphia Wagon Road in search 
of greater economic opportunity. This internal demographic shift, perhaps the largest in 
the colonial era, was markedly different from others, however. Though the migrants 
originated from a common location, they lacked homogeneity. Germans, Welsh, Scots, 
Scots-Irish, Dutch, and Swedes called the frontiers of Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia, home. Ethnic diversity produced a plurality of religious 
convictions. Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Nonconformists, and a plethora of other 
groups stood in contrast to the Anglicized lowcountry.
In 1952, Carl Bridenbaugh published a series of lectures entitled Myths and 
Realities: Societies o f the Colonial South in which he conceived of the backcountry in a 
regional sense, declaring it one of three distinct “souths” (the Chesapeake and Carolina 
society [South Carolina] comprising the other two). The significance of Bridenbaugh’s 
work was his notion that settlement of the southern backcountry was not the product of 
east-west migration but rather a north-south pipeline. Consequently, Bridenbaugh argued
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that the backcountry formed a unique cultural identity that differed from the coastal 
societies it bordered.2
Though the mere novelty of the backcountry settlements may have produced a
distinct culture, many historians have argued that settlers sought to integrate themselves
into the established coastal societies. However, this integration did not occur
immediately. In 1984, Jack P. Greene proposed a framework designed to analyze the
social development of colonial British America. Greene’s framework serves as a vital
tool in examining the social development of the southern backcountry. Greene proposed
three stages of development: social simplification, social elaboration, and social
replication. By the mid-18th century, coastal societies in Virginia and the Carolinas
managed to replicate British culture. Economic prosperity, a rigid social hierarchy, and a
demand for consumer goods allowed vital southern centers such as Williamsburg and
Charleston to achieve social replication. The backcountry, however, lagged behind.
Though the backcountry did not develop uniformly along a north-south axis, the youth of
most backcountry settlements has caused numerous historians, among them Richard
Beeman, Rachel Klein, and Richard Brown to describe conditions in line with the
processes of social simplification or social elaboration. Greene described the first stage
of social simplification as:
. . . characterized by much unsettlement and disorientation, as people 
sought to find ways to manipulate their new environments for their own 
sustenance and advantage while endeavoring, with limited success, to 
impose upon that environment social arrangements that, except possibly in
2 Carl Bridenbaugh, Myths and Realties: Societies o f the Colonial South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1952).
the orthodox colonies of Puritan New England, bore little more than a 
crude resemblance to those they had left behind.3
Settlers left Pennsylvania in search of more affordable land in greater quantities, but high
mobility, a harsh environment, and dispersed settlements forced them to abandon their
host values in full and adapt to their new surroundings.
As the population grew, as settlements expanded, and as the economy matured, 
settlers experienced a process of social elaboration. This phase “involved the articulation 
of socioeconomic, political, and cultural institutions, structures, and values that, although 
they were usually highly creolized variants of those found in the more developed areas of 
Britain, were sufficiently functional to enable local populations to assimilate them with 
relatively little difficulty."4 The backcountry, for the most part, did not replicate the 
coastal economy, causing back-settlers to create an economy characterized by “highly 
creolized variants.” Richard Beeman, in his study Evolution o f the Southern Backcountry: 
A Case Study o f Lunenburg County, Virginia, 1746-1832, noted that the quality of soil in 
the backcountry prohibited settlers from cultivating the same type of tobacco produced on 
tidewater plantations. This lower quality tobacco did not net the same profits as tidewater 
tobacco. Other obstacles settlers in the backcountry faced included increased 
transportation costs due to geographic barriers, a chronic shortage of white labor given 
the wide accessibility of land, and the slow integration of slaves into the backcountry. As 
a result, farmers turned to foodstuffs. Consequently, the tobacco production that had
3 Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, eds., Colonial British America: Essays in the New History 
o f the Early Modern Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 13.
4 Ibid
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allowed the tidewater gentry to replicate British behaviors and norms failed to take root 
in the backcountry, leaving settlers with a less stratified social structure.5
In South Carolina, the backcountry lacked the rice plantations that had made the 
province the wealthiest of all British colonies. Like their counterparts in Virginia, South 
Carolina back-settlers had no reliable source of labor. Due to bands of criminals roaming 
the countryside during the 1760s, lowcountry merchants refused to sell slaves to 
backcountry farmers. Coastal officials did not want criminals, many of whom were 
mulatto, to seize possession of slaves or provide safe haven for runaways. In the absence 
of a reliable labor source, as in Virginia, most back-settlers turned to foodstuffs. As 
George Lloyd Johnson pointed out in his community study of the Upper Pee Dee region, 
“wealth was intimately tied to slavery in the South Carolina backcountry.”6 But the 
backcountry lacked the number of slaves necessary to produce the wealth that lowcountry 
planters enjoyed. Moreover, as T.H. Breen, in an essay in Jack Greene and J.R. Pole’s 
Colonial British America: Essays in the New History o f the Early M odem Era, noted, 
“Agriculture which was everywhere the occupation of the first settlers, was not enough to 
cast them all in one mold, since there are certain types of agriculture [mixed agriculture] 
which tend to maintain equal wealth among individuals, and other types [staple
n
agriculture] which tend to destroy it.” Since slaves were in short supply and the land did
5 Richard Beeman, The Evolution o f the Southern Backcountry: A Case Study o f 
Lunenburg County, Virginia, 1746-1832 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1984), 33-35.
6 George Lloyd Johnson, The Frontier in the Colonial South: South Carolina 
Backcountry, 1736-1800 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 79.
7 T.H. Breen, “Creative Adaptations: People and Cultures,” Chapter 7 in Greene and 
Pole, Colonial British America , 213.
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not support staple agriculture, the South Carolina backcountry economy, like its partner 
in Virginia, preserved greater equality among its inhabitants.
The idea of backcountry society copying the norms of the coastal establishment is 
found in a seminal study of the South Carolina backcountry: Rachel Klein’s Unification 
o f a Slave State: The Rise o f a Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry, 1760- 
1808. Klein questions the credit cotton has received for unifying South Carolina in the 
aftermath of the Revolution. Instead, she posits that the framework for integration existed 
in the backcountry in the form of a rising elite who shared common economic interests 
with coastal planters. Fundamental to Klein’s argument is her conception of the nature of 
authority in the backcountry. She asserts that the rising elite were “men of influence” in
o
their respective regions due to their economic clout and political authority. As 
storeowners, speculators, mill operators, militia officers, and justices of the peace, this 
small portion of the population established themselves as leaders of backcountry society. 
Rebuking Frederick Jackson Turner’s vision of the frontier as egalitarian and anti­
authoritarian, Klein portrays a backcountry moving towards a stratified social order. Her 
examination of the Regulator Movement promotes this point.
In the wake of the devastation wrought by the Cherokee War of 1759-1761, bands 
of criminals targeted back-settlers, rendering the economy unstable and property unsafe. 
Without any courts in the backcountry, any criminal arrested had to be brought to 
Charleston; but the difficulty of traveling to the coast allowed criminals to escape justice. 
When the colonial assembly refused to take action, men throughout the backcountry 
started a vigilante movement to bring these criminals to justice. Though many historians
8 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 84-85.
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have viewed the Regulator Movement as proof of a sectional divide between the 
backcountry and lowcountry, Klein rejects this notion. She asserts that coastal leaders 
sympathized with Regulator demands for courts and other government institutions, but 
that colonial protests against the Stamp Act and other parliamentary efforts to tax the 
colonies prevented the assembly from taking action. Klein points to a fundamental social 
problem in the backcountry between two groups: hunters and planters. While planters 
sought to establish property rights and establish markets for their goods, hunters lived as 
nomads, killing cattle and squatting on land, including Indian lands which exposed the 
entire backcountry to attack. Since most hunters became criminals, the Regulators acted 
not only to petition the Assembly for courts and other government institutions but also to 
correct “a fundamental social disunity.” 9 South Carolina was one of few colonies that 
lacked a vagrancy law. Moreover, the lack of government institutions allowed acts of 
drunkenness, sexual impropriety, and other forms of immorality to go unpunished. In 
response, the Regulators captured and whipped the poor and indigent, an act that Klein 
views as establishing a particular type of social order in line with the interests of the 
rising elite.
Klein’s study is significant in discussing the Revolution because she asserts that 
the influence and authority the rising elite held in their respective regions determined the 
breakdown of allegiances. Since only 6 of 120 leading Regulators were active loyalists, 
Klein posits that these “men of influence” deserve credit for helping to secure the 
backcountry for the Whigs. Klein’s argument that the rising elite shared a common 
economic interest with coastal planters is correct. However, Klein grants too much
9 Richard Maxwell Brown, The South Carolina Regulators (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of the Harvard University Press, 1963), 24.
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agency to the rising elite. As Ronald Hoffman noted, “The incompatibly of two major 
values, equality and deference, which had been developing during the colonial era, 
reached the point of crucial confrontation during the Revolution.” 10 For Klein to assert 
that deference trumped equality is to brush aside notions of independence and authority 
found in other works that undermine her argument.
In an introductory essay to a collection of essays on the backcountry during the 
American Revolution, Jack Greene submitted a framework for understanding the 
backcountry by addressing the issues of independence, improvement, and authority. 
Greene argued that widespread independence existed in the American colonies due to 
extensive opportunities for landownership. Green defines independence as “freedom from 
the will of others. . . a sovereignty of self in all public and private relations.” 11 “No social 
excuse” for failure existed given the opportunities for success. In order to enjoy their 
independence to the fullest extent, Greene argued settlers worked to improve their 
societies. Improvement did not involve the creation of a brand new society; rather, 
settlers looked east to recreate British society through social simplification, elaboration, 
and replication. Fundamental to Greene’s notion of improvement is the desire of 
independent men to exploit other men by making them their dependents and to create a 
deferential social order. 12
10Ronald Hoffman, “The ‘Disaffected’ in the Revolutionary South,” in Alfred F. Young 
ed., The American Revolution: Explorations in the History o f American Radicalism 
(Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), 300.
" Ibid., 12.
I
~ Jack P. Greene, ” Independence, Improvement, and Authority: Towards a Framework 
for Understanding the Histories' of the Southern Backcountry during the Era of the 
American Revolution,” in Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., An 
Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 13.
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Though Greene emphasized the desire of each new society to build a social 
hierarchy, he questioned the strength of such models. Despite the move towards a society 
based on concepts of hierarchy and deference, authority within the backcountry and the 
colonies at large remained fragile. Opportunities for land ownership reduced dependence. 
Deference no longer served as an instrument of social control as economic opportunities 
narrowed the gap between elites and non-elites. Political figureheads were empowered 
through “passive noninterest.” Greene argued that individuals came to America seeking 
freedom to pursue their private interests, not to meddle in public affairs, and relinquished 
their right to pursue public office. Thus, elites governed by default. When individuals did
] 3take action and defy authority, they did so in defense of their independence.
Greene’s notions of widespread independence and weak authority challenges 
Klein’s notion that the elite men of the backcountry wielded enough personal and 
political clout to secure the backcountry for the Whigs. Klein correctly declares that the 
backcountry sought to replicate lowcountry norms. The Regulator Movement, in her 
eyes, was a plea for structure and authority based on the stratified social order of 
lowcountry society. Greene admitted, however, that independence weakened deferential 
authority. Although men sought to exploit each other and to create a deferential order 
based on dependency, they could not because backcountry conditions created a society 
where men achieved “freedom from the will of others.”
Three-fourths of South Carolina’s white population resided beyond the piedmont, 
yet Klein gives agency only to a minority. Klein’s neglect of the non-elite within the 
backcountry clashes with Greene’s contention of widespread independence. Klein holds
13 Ibid., 22-36.
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to Richard Brown’s assertion in The South Carolina Regulators that the Regulator 
movement was designed to create a specific social order in line with the interests of the 
planter class; in doing so, she rejects the notion that the Regulator movement was a 
popular movement. Yet, in her own work, Klein cited a comment from an observer of 
Regulator activity: “Every Man of Property is a Regulator at Heart.”14 Such a statement 
suggests the backcountry movement was more than the handiwork of the rising elite, 
given the widespread diffusion of property. Because a majority of back-settlers wanted 
their private property secured and civil order restored, Klein exaggerates the authority of 
the rising elite.
Moreover, despite Klein’s contention that the backcountry desired slaves, one 
particular event (which she omits from her analysis) during the Regulator movement 
threatened to shatter white unity in a colony highly susceptible to slave insurrection. A 
tense encounter between the Regulators and an armed force dispatched by the colonial 
governor nearly led to an invasion of the lowcountry by the Regulators. The severity of 
the encounter was best described by Charles Woodmason, an Anglican itinerant and 
Regulator spokesman, who wrote, “The People were about to march downward and 
destroy all the Plantations of those Gentlemen whom they thought in the Plot -  And it 
was with difficulty they were restrain’d” 15 The interests of the backcountry and 
lowcountry did not seem to align in this instance, despite Klein’s assertion that the
14 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 61.
15 Richard J. Hooker, ed., The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve o f the Revolution: The 
Journal ancl Other Writings o f Charles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, 1953), 181-83.
15
coastal establishment sympathized with Regulator demands and the elite shared common 
interests.
Another work that challenges Klein’s thesis is Wayne Lee’s Crowds and Soldiers 
in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture o f Violence in Riot and War. Lee examines 
the use of violence as a means of political protest, which has traditionally been viewed by 
historians as a rejection of authority and challenge to the social order. Lee rejects this 
view, arguing that violence was a means of communication for those alienated from the 
formal political process; he posits that rioters were restrained by the need to appear 
legitimate to the larger popular community.16 According to Lee, “Rioters patterned their 
behavior in order to emphasize the legitimacy of their actions, and the need to appear 
legitimate arose from the simple fact that the tool of the rioter was violence, with all its
17implications of threatening the social order.” Lee’s analysis of the North Carolina 
Regulators demonstrates the power of public opinion. The Regulators did not turn to 
armed conflict when they had a grievance; they followed a path of legal recourse before 
taking up arms. But even when they did resort to violence, their actions were restrained. 
When they besieged the Hillsborough courthouse, the act that provided the impetus for 
Governor Tyron to attack the Regulators, they chose their targets carefully. In an earlier 
confrontation, Governor Tyron refrained from attacking the Regulators, recognizing that 
the public would not consider his use of violence to be politically legitimate. Lee’s study 
exposed the authority each individual held in determining what was politically legitimate.
16 Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture o f 
Violence in Riot and War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 7, 43.
17 Ibid., 2-3.
16
When Lee’s study of violence and political legitimacy is applied to South 
Carolina, the idea of a rising elite embodying authority in the backcountry continues to 
fall apart. The Regulators encountered opposition through their use of violence, but this 
opposition came from within the backcountry rather than from the socially mature 
lowcountry. Citizens objected to the beatings and whippings used by Regulators to root 
out the indigent and correct the social ills of backcountry society. The Moderators, who 
Regulator expert Richard Brown claimed were more numerous than historians have
acknowledged, openly opposed these Regulator methods and, as a result, brought an end
1 8to the Regulator movement. Klein dismisses the Moderators as belonging to the lower 
echelons of society and opposed to the goals of the rising elite. But the rise of the 
Moderators revealed that the Regulators lacked political legitimacy in their use of 
violence and individuals possessed the authority necessary to stop them. Though Klein 
extols the influence and clout of the rising elite, the power to determine what was 
politically legitimate was rooted in widespread independence and an aversion to a 
deferential order.
Klein’s depiction of the Moderators as belonging to the lower echelons of society 
points to a larger issue of class conflict. She argued that, “Conflict within the 
Revolutionary backcountry may not have been a class struggle in any simple sense, but it 
did have an important class dimension.”19 Klein asserts that this class dimension was 
visible in the clash of interests between Regulator planters and the indigent hunters 
whose behavior they sought to correct. However, such a statement imposes far too much 
economic homogeneity on both Whigs and loyalists. As Robert Lambert noted in the only
18 Brown, South Carolina Regulators, chapter 6.
19 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 81.
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published study of loyalists in South Carolina, the large loyalist army captured by the 
Whigs in late 1775 was economically diverse. The force consisted of men owning 
anywhere from 100 to 1,500 acres. While some produced substantial amounts of grain, 
indigo, and livestock with slave labor, others cleared only enough land to subsist without 
the help of negroes.20 Both hunters and men of prominence in the backcountry opposed 
the Whigs.
Economics forms the crux of Richard Beeman’s argument, another historian 
whose study of the Virginia backcountry implicitly challenges Klein’s findings. Beeman, 
like Klein, acknowledges the existence of elite individuals in Lunenburg County, but he 
chronicles the conditions that prevented them from establishing a deferential society, 
conditions not unlike those in South Carolina. Beeman drew a line between personal 
authority and political authority. Whereas tidewater planters amassed a fortune through 
tobacco cultivation and land speculation that served as a means of persuasion and 
influence, the local elite in Lunenburg County lacked the personal wealth and influence
9 |
necessary to command respect from their peers. " Additionally, the elite opted to forgo 
luxury goods in favor of using that money to purchase slaves; thus, they lacked the
79consumer goods so crucial in denoting gentility."" The economic shortcomings of the 
local elite were exposed by Glasglow merchants who provided credit to small farmers
7 7when the local elite came up short." Despite a large influx of slaves in the 1750s and 
1760s, a social hierarchy failed to form. During the economic growth of those decades,
7 0 Robert Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 49.0 j
Beeman, The Evolution o f the Southern Backcountry, 95.
22 Ibid.,77.
23 lbicl, 79.
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the poor enjoyed an increase in overall land ownership and more yeoman farmers owned 
slaves in Lunenburg County than in any tidewater county.24 In general, a higher standard 
of living resulted for all residents. Without personal authority, these elite men were 
unable to effectively exercise their authority as officeholders. The widespread 
independence Greene proposed as a framework certainly applied to Lunenburg County, 
Virginia, economically as well as politically. Contested elections and massive “treating” 
of the masses exposed the lack of a deferential order.25
The backcountries in the various colonies did not achieve the same economic 
prosperity as the coastal societies they neighbored. Consequently, as Beeman noted, the 
rising elite failed to differentiate themselves from the yeoman majority and to command 
their respect as figures of authority. The presence of criminals throughout the 1760s 
hindered the spread of slavery into the South Carolina backcountry, the cornerstone upon 
which the stratified social order in the lowcountry was built. In the absence of a reliable 
labor source back-settlers turned to foodstuffs. The staple crops that had enriched the 
coastal elite were not easily transplanted to the backcountry. Consequently, the local elite 
lacked the personal wealth that was necessary to wield personal authority. Even though 
the local elite held positions of political power, their lack of wealth undermined their 
formal authority due to a narrow economic gap between elite and yeoman farmers.
The failure to unify the backcountry economically with the lowcountry stemmed 
from the differing stages of development that Greene outlined. The backcountry lagged 
behind the established coastal societies because settlement had occurred towards the end 
of the colonial era; though the backcountry was making strides, its progress was
24 Ibid., 66-67.
25 Ibid., 9J-95.
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interrupted by the Revolution. Two regions at two different stages of development
consequently produced conflicting interests. Ronald Hoffman provided an example of
this conflict. Wheat cultivation in the Carolina piedmont had produced economic
prosperity but it was threatened by colonial protests such as the Continental Association,
which prohibited the exportation of all agricultural goods to Britain, except rice. The
Continental Association demanded that farmers give up their prosperity for abstract
principles. The back-settlers opposed participation; as Hoffman stated, “they were not
given to concerns about individual liberties and natural rights. What they wanted most
seemed little enough: modest good fortune and some security in their lives.”26 The
Continental Association, a creation of coastal planters and merchants, was not in the best
interest of back-settlers, and they did not abide by the agreement out of deference to their
political leaders. As Hoffman noted:
The incompatibly of two major values, equality and deference, which had 
been developing during the colonial era, reached the point of crucial 
confrontation during the Revolution. Consequently, when the 
revolutionary leadership placed heavy demands on the people -  demands 
in many ways more oppressive than the comparatively mild tyranny of 
Parliament -  many men, especially those with limited involvement in their97
political culture, resented and resisted them."
Jack Greene asserted that widespread independence weakened authority. Men preferred 
to pursue their private interests rather than meddle in public affairs. However, the 
Revolution created a situation where private interests clashed with public affairs. 
Consequently, individuals prioritized their local concerns at the expense of the greater 
good.28 Because the rising elite, whose interests paralleled the coastal elite more so than
26 Ronald Hoffman, “The ‘Disaffected’ in the Revolutionary South,” 299-300.
27 Ibid., 300.
28 Greene, “Independence, Improvement, Authority,” 23.
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their yeoman neighbors, did not exercise strong authority, local concerns dominated 
backcountry politics.
When evidence of economic differences, widespread independence, and weak 
authority within the backcountry are taken as a whole, the coastal governments faced a 
daunting task in galvanizing support for the revolutionary cause. Though Klein is right to 
challenge her predecessors’ notion of a staunch sectional divide between the backcountry 
and the lowcountry on the basis of the Regulator Movement, her explanation for how the 
Whigs gained control of the backcountry is insufficient given evidence provided by other 
historians and weaknesses within her own argument. Ties between the two regions were 
not strong enough to produce unity based on a shared ideology of self-rule and 
republicanism. Rev. Charles Woodmason demonstrated the ease with which back-settlers 
could turn the same republican rhetoric coastal leaders were using against Parliament on 
their own colonial government when he wrote: “We are Free-Men -  British Subjects -  
Not Born Slaves -  We contribute our Proportion in all Public Taxations, and discharge 
our Duty to the Public, equally with our Fellow Provincials Ye[t] We do not participate
29with them in the Rights and Benefits which they Enjoy, tho’ equally Entituled to them. 
The legacy of the Regulator Movement created bitterness in the backcountry, but 
historians have overstated the importance of this movement in creating antagonism to the 
independence movement. The wider picture of economic, political, and social 
development serves as a more convincing answer to the question of why the South 
Carolina backcountry produced such opposition to the patriot cause. The question that 
remains to be answered is what Whig forces planned to do about this opposition.
TC)~ Hooker, The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve o f Revolution, 215.
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CHAPTER II
INTIMIDATION
In June 1775, the South Carolina Council of Safety, one of two extralegal political 
organizations developed by the Whigs, dispatched a three-man committee into the 
backcountry to “explain to the people at large the nature of the unhappy disputes between 
Great Britain and the American Colonies.”30 The three-man committee was made up of 
William Henry Drayton, a prominent politician and arguably South Carolina’s most 
vehement patriot, the Rev. William Tennent, head of the Independent (Presbyterian) 
Church of Charleston, and the Rev. Oliver Hart, a Baptist minister of humble roots.
Given the isolation of the backcountry from colonial protests, the mission of these three 
men was to take ten years of revolutionary fervor and convey it to the backcountry in two 
months. Words of persuasion failed early and often, and the committee, spearheaded by 
Drayton, turned to intimidation in order to overcome the differences between the regions.
Enthusiasm for the Whigs ran low in the backcountry. One month into the 
mission, Tennent wrote to Henry Laurens, “They [back-settlers] firmly believe that no
30 Order of Council of Safety, July 23, 1775, in R.W. Gibbes, ed., Documentary History 
o f the American Revolution: Consisting o f Letters and Papers Relating to the Contest fo r  
Liberty, Chiefly in South Carolina, in the Possession o f the Editor, and Other Sources, 
Vols 1-3 (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1855), 1:106. NOTE: Any further citations 
refer to volume one unless otherwise noted.
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man that comes from below, and that no paper printed there can speak the truth.”31 Oliver 
Hart recorded in his diary that “Some of the neighbors came to see us, with whom we had 
much Conversation about the present State of the Times; found them so fixed on the Side 
of the Ministry, that no argument on the contrary Side seemed to have any weight with 
them; they generally acknowledge that they know but little about the Matter, and yet are 
fixed.”32 A pamphlet circulating throughout the backcountry entitled An Address o f the 
People o f Great Britain to the Inhabitants o f America, reminded the back-settlers that “It 
is hard that the charge of our intending to enslave you should come oftenest from the 
mouths of those lawyers who in your southern provinces at least, have long made you 
slaves to themselves.”33
William Henry Drayton, with his fiery oratorical skills, sought to overcome the 
ignorance of the back-settlers that Hart spoke of and to educate them on the matter of 
revolution. But Drayton’s use of rhetoric fell on deaf ears. His advocacy of 
republicanism had little effect on men who were underrepresented in the Assembly. The 
Whigs had their work cut out for them. The nature of the opposition was best exemplified 
by one back-settler who expressed a desire to see one thousand Bostonians killed in 
battle.34 Given the challenges before him, Drayton thought it necessary to carry a pair of 
pistols and a sword at all times. '
jl Mr. Tennent to Mr. Laurens, August 20, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 145.
32 “Oliver Hart’s Diary of the Journey to the Backcountry,” in Journal o f the South 
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On numerous occasions, Drayton and Tennent ordered residents of towns to 
assemble only to have no one show up, or if they did, they often refused to sign the 
Association. At a Dutch Church, Drayton gave a speech to a group of ethnic Germans, 
but not one of them stepped forward to sign the Association. Thomas Fletchall, an 
influential militia colonel, on orders from the Council of Safety, mustered his regiment 
and read them the Association. When his men refused to sign it, Fletchall reported, “it
ozr _
was out of my power to compel them to.”' The early opposition Drayton encountered 
surely wounded his pride. Drayton was not humble about his rhetorical skills. During one 
discourse he proclaimed, “the falling tears from the audience showed that their hearts 
were penetrated, and that we might hope for success.’07 But Drayton’s faith in the power 
of his rhetoric is hard to reconcile with accusations of a prominent loyalist that Drayton 
intentionally returned lists of associators containing duplicate names to the Provincial 
Congress.38
Drayton’s words of persuasion did not resonate with the diverse backcountry 
population. His task was to find some way, as Fletchall said, to “compel them.” The 
Provincial Congress in June 1775 passed measures designed to polarize society. The 
Congress resolved that “any person having violated or refused obedience to the authority 
of the Provincial Congress, shall. . . be questioned. . . and upon due conviction of either 
of the offenses aforesaid, and continuing contumacious, such person shall. . . be declared 
and advertised, as an enemy to the Liberties of America, and an object fo r  the resentment
36 Thomas Fletchall to President of Council of Safety, July 24, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. 
Hist., 123-4.
37 From Mr. Drayton, Aug. 9, 1775, in ibid.A34
38 “A Loyalist View of the Drayton-Tennent-Hart Mission to the Backcountry,” SCHM  
67, no. 1 (January 1966), 18.
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o f the public. . . .”39 The Provincial Congress could advertise the names of those enemies 
of liberty all it wanted, but without some means of enforcement, the resolution was 
nothing more than empty rhetoric.
The Whigs found a solution in economic warfare. The Council of Safety 
attempted to marginalize those in opposition to independence by limiting trade 
opportunities and cutting off access to essential commercial services. While promoting 
the revolutionary cause to a Dutch audience during his backcountry tour, Drayton 
declared that “no non-subscriber in this settlement will be allowed to purchase at, or sell 
to this store of Charles Town.”40 A few days later, Drayton addressed another group of 
Dutchmen, yet they refused to sign the Association. In response, Drayton decreed, “no 
miller, who was a subscriber, should grind wheat or corn for any person who was a 
nonsubscriber.” According to Drayton, “This gave an immediate shock and has given a 
general alarm among the Dutch, from which. . . I expect a desirable effect.”41 Millers and
42blacksmiths refused to serve those who joined the enemy. Governor William Campbell
bemoaned the treatment of non-associators when he wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth:
For their attachment to their King and the constitution of their country, 
they are cut off from the only mart they had for their little produce and 
from the only place where they could supply their necessities. Salt, that 
most necessary article to their very existence, they are totally deprived of, 
which will render it impossible for them to preserve their winter 
provisions; they can neither have ammunition to defend themselves nor 
clothes to cover them.43
TO' William Edwin Hemphill, ed., Extracts from the Journals o f the Provincial Congress o f 
South Carolina, 1775-1776 (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1960), 59.
40 Drayton to Tennent, August 7, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 128-131
41 Drayton to Council of Safety, August 16, 1775, in ibid., 141.
42 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 86.
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Scottish Highlanders were afraid to take up arms against the Whigs for fear of having 
their property seized. While the Highlanders would not be active Whigs, more 
importantly, they were not active supporters of the Crown.44
The Council of Safety recognized the need to draw economic battle lines and to 
preserve certain privileges for those friendly to the independence movement, lest these 
individuals jump ship. Drayton reported to the Council of Safety, “I have to assure you 
that unless our friends in the country find that the non-subscribers are debarred all 
communication with Charles Town and all trade with the country stores, they will be 
much chagrined; and bad consequences may ensure.”45 In order to ensure that non- 
associators were economically marginalized, Drayton ordered a guard of troops to be 
placed near the western entrances of Charleston to check whether those bringing wagons
and trade goods to the city had signed the Association 46
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Economic warfare may have spurred many potential loyalists to sign the
Association, but a greater threat to the revolutionary cause came from the presence of
royal officials. So long as the royal government existed in the colony, the non-associators
felt protected. Gov. William Campbell had written numerous pamphlets to the
backcountry from Charleston criticizing Whig actions and emphasizing the sectional
divide. Drayton acknowledged the threat the governor posed:
He animates these men -  he tempts them -  and although they are now 
recovered, yet their fidelity is precarious, if he is at liberty to job them
44 David Wilson, The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest o f South Carolina and 
Georgia, 1775-1780 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 23.
45 Drayton to Council of Safety, Aug. 21, 1775, in ibid.A50.
46 Drayton and Tennent to Council of Safety, Aug. 9, 1775, in ibid., 132.
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again, and lay new toils for them. Gentlemen, allow me, in the strongest 
terms, to recommend that you make hostages of the Governor and the 
officers.47
By September 1775, Drayton and the Whigs earned a major victory when the governor 
fled to a British warship in Charleston Harbor, ending royal authority and allowing the 
Whigs to govern without formal opposition.
At the heart of the need to topple royal government was the issue of authority, an 
issue that had special meaning for the backcountry. Authority, as suggested by the lack of 
formal institutions and widespread independence in the backcountry, was never as strong 
as it was in the lowcountry. The average backcountry farmer went about their day-to-day 
tasks without feeling the pressing hand of government due to the lack of courts, schools, 
and Anglican churches. Furthermore, the lack of political integration also contributed to 
the emphasis on local concerns at the expense of provincial needs. Thus, the backcountry 
was not beholden to the Council of Safety or to the Provincial Congress. After all, the 
Council of Safety was comprised of thirteen men, eight of whom resided in Charleston
4 o
and the remaining five came from the surrounding lowcountry. The backcountry had no 
representation; given the fact that three-fourths of South Carolina’s white inhabitants 
resided in the backcountry, the actions of the Council of Safety was the handiwork of a 
minority. The only way to compel men to join the Whig cause was by bringing a greater 
degree of authority to the backcountry through the use of the militia. The militia 
represented the hand of authority in an area long devoid of government institutions; it
Mr. Drayton to Council of Safety, Sept. 17, 1775 in Gibbes., Doc. Hist., 189.
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carried out the will of the Whig government and suppressed political dissent 49 Drayton’s 
words of persuasion had failed to sway a region not interested in Revolution. Even he 
recognized the need for new methods when he wrote to the Council of Safety, “vigorous 
measures are absolutely necessary. . . In giving you this information, I tell a melancholy 
truth; but I do my duty. ”50
Using threats of physical violence to influence political allegiance was not a tactic 
created as a result of the backcountry challenge. Physical intimidation was used long 
before the militia marched to the backcountry in the form of the Charleston mob. As the 
fourth-largest city in the American colonies and, like any city, a hotbed of merchants, 
Charleston housed a high concentration of individuals opposed to independence. 
Although one observer noted that “great numbers” opposed subscribing their names to 
“so treasonable an engagement. . . few dared refuse,” for fear of retribution from “the 
fury of a desperate and vindictive mob.”51 The urban mob was responsible for helping to 
make Charleston safe for Whig government and allowed the revolutionaries to turn their 
attention to the backcountry.
The Council of Safety and Provincial Congress moved quickly and discreetly to 
organize a militia. In early June, the Provincial Congress proposed raising two regiments 
of infantry of 750 men each and a cavalry regiment of 500; in order to fund the militia,
49 For more on the militia as an instrument of suppressing political dissent see, Clyde R. 
Ferguson, “Carolina and Georgia Patriot and Loyalist Militia in Action, 1778-1783,” in 
Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., The Southern Experience in the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978.), 174-199. See also 
Jack Greene’s essay in Hoffman, An Uncivil War, 30-34 for more on how weak authority 
and localism created the circumstances by which the Whig militias were forced to 
intervene.
50 Drayton to the Council of Safety, Aug. 21, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 153.
51 Krawczynski, Drayton, 137.
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the Congress issued 150,000 pounds of paper money.52 While these new forces were 
raised initially with the purpose of defending against a slave revolt, Drayton traveled 
throughout the backcountry and, when his rhetoric failed, made threats that these new, 
loyal regiments were capable of carrying out.
The formation of a Whig militia not only offered a way to carry out the wishes of 
the Whig government, it provided opposition to loyalist forces in the region. Armed 
skirmishes were few and far between; both sides relied on posturing and a show of force 
rather than an actual shooting war to intimidate undecided parties into joining or 
preventing them from supporting the opposition. The Whigs’ ability to attract greater 
numbers ultimately contributed to their victory. Drayton observed that “the whole 
country, that is the King’s men as they are called, were terrified by the march and the 
cannon” as he traveled with the militia between towns. In another observation Drayton 
proclaimed, “it is plain their [loyalist] influence is declining, and that their people are 
terrified. And this last, I assure you, is a fact. They never dreamed we would take the
53field; they thought their boast of 4,000 would ensure their security against us.”"
Drayton used the militia to make examples of those who openly opposed the 
Whig government. Moses Kirkland, a former Regulator, served as a Whig militia officer 
but switched sides when he was passed over for a promotion. Drayton ordered his 
plantation ransacked; five thousand weight of indigo was destroyed and sixty slaves were 
confiscated.54 Drayton also issued a declaration declaring that “all such persons as,
52 “Charles Town Loyalism in 1775: The Secret Reports of Alexander Innes,” in SCHM  
63, no. 3 (July 1962), 133.
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54 Extract from an Intercepted Letter of Frederick George Mulcaster to Governor Grant, 
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without lawful authority, shall assemble in arms, in company with, or by instigation of 
the said Moses Kirkland, will be deemed public enemies to be suppressed by the sword 
[my emphasis].”55 The edict “so terrified Kirkland’s followers, that now he is in a manner 
alone, and having tried every effort to procure assistance on the south side of Saluda in 
vain, he is now invisible -  is never two hours in a place, and he never sleeps in a 
house.”56
Drayton did not confine the threats to men of influence like Kirkland. In 
September 1775, in the most western area of South Carolina, the Ninety-Six district, a 
confrontation ensued between loyalist and patriot forces. Drayton marched into the town 
of Ninety-Six and ordered the militia to muster. Under a newly ratified provincial law, he 
punished those who refused. He declared, “I shall march and attack, as public enemies, 
all and every person in arms, or to be in arms, in this part of the Colony, in opposition to
S7the measures of Congress.” He made good on his threat by dispatching parties with 
orders to “rifle houses break locks and seize the papers of those who had opposed the
CO
Designs of Congress.” Because of Drayton’s tactics, Thomas Fletchall, who lived in the 
Ninety-Six district, was “so struck with terror” that the “poor Bastard . . . went so far as 
to acquaint Drayton that it was his opinion that we [loyalists] should submit to any 
terms.”59 Days after the confrontation, a treaty was signed between the Whig government 
and the people of Ninety-Six. So long as the people of the district “shall choose to behave 
peaceably,” they were permitted to keep their property. The subsequent peace speaks
55 South Carolina -  Ninety-Six District, Aug. 30, 1775, in ibid.., 164.
56 Mr. Drayton to Council of Safety, Sept. 11, 1775, in ibid., 173.
57 Declaration, South Carolina -  Ninety-Six District, Sept. 13, 1775, in ibid., 182-3.
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volumes about the nature of the opposition to the Whigs. When confronted with direct 
force, the back-settlers of the Ninety-Six district chose to acquiesce to Whig authority in 
order to pursue their private ends. While in the peace accord they affirmed their desire to 
remain a part of the British empire, they also promised not to support British troops in the 
event of an invasion.60 Political ideology played very little role in determining allegiance. 
Drayton’s intimidation tactics at Ninety-Six sidelined hundreds, if not thousands, of 
potential loyalists.
The polarizing tactics of the Whig leadership quickly penetrated down through 
the ranks of the militia. Col. William Thomson, a militia commander, wrote to Henry 
Laurens boasting that his men were beginning to “observe that those who are not for 
America, are undoubtedly against it. Such discourses we hear spreading through our 
camps, and I have reason to believe is their determination.” He expressed hope that by 
“putting militia law in force against the defaulters,” loyalist efforts would fail. 61
Though Drayton and the Whigs did implement “militia law” and punish those 
who opposed them, Drayton also bluffed to scare people into submission. Thomas Brown 
intercepted a letter en route from Drayton to Whig colonel Richard Richardson. The letter 
contained instructions to Richardson to raise a party of men to join those already under 
Drayton’s command in ransacking and burning the plantations of non-associators.62 
Drayton had sent the letter intending for it to be intercepted by the loyalists.
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Drayton did not want to shed blood. He recognized that violence would have “laid
the foundation for lasting animosities.”63 In addition, Whig victory was not guaranteed if
the two forces came to battle. While besieged at Ninety-Six in November 1775, the
commanding officer, Major Andrew Williamson, wrote to Drayton that Whig forces were
very weak, possessing only thirty pounds of gunpowder.64 Although the siege ended in a
truce with minor bloodshed, prospects had looked bleak for the Whigs.
By December of 1775, the Whigs had solidified their authority in the
backcountry. In late November, Col. Richardson rounded up his Camden-based militia
and set out to crush their loyalist foes. The ensuing “Snow Campaign” (named for the
fluke snow storm that coated South Carolina that month) eradicated loyalist forces and
took 136 of their leaders prisoners. Richardson had amassed an impressive force that was
surely an intimidating sight. The 4,000 - 5,000 men under his command had a grave
effect on loyalist efforts:
The number has a good effect, strikes terror, and shows what can be done 
on occasion. . . . we have been successful in disarming most of the 
unhappy people; they are coming in with fear and trembling, giving up 
their arms, with a sensible contrition for the errors they have been guilty 
of. The spirit of discord being much abated, most of the [loyalist] Captains 
have come in, and good part of the companies under them.65
Drayton and the Whig militias had invoked aggressive tactics to suppress those
who posed a threat to Whig authority. Such policies nearly worked against the Whigs,
however. During one of his discourses to a group of Germans, the settlers “were so
possessed with an idea, that the rangers were posted here to force their signatures to the
61 Mr. Drayton to Council of Safety, September 17, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 189.
64 Mr. Williamson to Mr. Drayton, Giving an Account of the Siege, Action, and Treaty at 
Ninety-Six, Nov. 25, 1775, in ibid., 218.
65 Mr. Richardson to Mr. Laurens, Dec. 22, 1775, in ibid., 243.
32
66association, that they would not by any arguments be induced to come near us.” Edward 
Musgrove, a prominent backcountry planter, chastised Drayton: “The great inadvertency 
of some of the backwoods committee, who should keep from letting out some foolish 
speeches to scare the people into their measures, which effects quite the other way -  
rather exasperates than frightens.” Thomas Brown wrote that Drayton’s “acts of 
violence so incensed our People” that he and Cunningham assembled 1,200 men in five 
days and nearly drove Fletchall, who was reluctant to confront the Whigs, out of camp. 
Fear of alienating the population was visible in the opposition Drayton’s proposal to 
capture twelve key loyalist leaders met in the Council of Safety. The resolution passed by 
a 4-3 decision.68 During the second session of the Provincial Congress, the Rev. William 
Tennent had served on a committee that drew up the Association he and Drayton were 
circulating. Henry Laurens, president of the Provincial Congress, believed that a clause 
labeling non-associators “inimical to the Liberty of the Colonies” was too harsh; he 
clashed with Tennent, who insisted on leaving it in.69
Despite the concerns over alienating back-settlers through intimidation and harsh
language, Drayton and the Whig leadership managed to walk a fine line between acts of
terrorism and acts of necessity. In the aftermath of the Snow Campaign, the Whig
government granted widespread pardons to those who had taken up arms in the name of
the king. Richardson noted that:
The people are now more convinced than ever of their being wrong. The 
lenitive measures have had a good effect; the spirit and power is gone
66 From Drayton and Tennent, Aug. 7, 1775, in ibid., 128.
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from them and I am sure (if not interrupted by designing men on our side) 
that country, which I had it in my power to lay waste (and which the 
people expected), will be happy, and peace and tranquility take place of 
ruin and discord -  a wished for event.70
Those who had taken up arms against the Whigs quickly changed their minds. The
majority of non-associators who surrendered during the Snow Campaign became
“sensible of their error” and went home denouncing those leaders who had misled them
about the “nature of the present contest.”71 Such action reinforces the idea that
allegiances were seldom ideologically based, but more the result of which side offered
the best protection.
The Whig government also worked to solidify its own authority by granting
leniency to its former enemies. The Provincial Congress passed a resolution restoring the
right to trade to those former non-associators, with the exception of arms and
ammunition, which would only be returned by swearing an oath of loyalty. The Congress
also resolved “That the respective Committees and supporters of the American cause,
ought to discourage the use of any opprobrious language, reflecting upon the late
misbehaviour of the aforesaid insurgents, who, behaving in a peaceable manner, ought to
be treated with friendship and humanity, tenderness and moderation, as the Congress
wishes to reclaim rather than to punish.”72
The Whigs also made major political concessions. When formed the Provincial
Congress was formed in June 1775, it dramatically increased the representation of the
backcountry, though it still remained disproportional given its advantage in population.
The backcountry was allocated only 3 of 30 seats in the colonial Assembly, but in the
70Col. Richardson to Hon. H. Laurens, January 2, 1776, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 248.
71 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 50.~j0~ Hemphill, Extracts from the Provincial Congress, 231-32.
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new Provincial Congress, it garnered 55 of 187 seats.73 Following the Declaration of 
Independence, the new Assembly formed under the South Carolina state constitution 
disestablished the Anglican Church, a major concession to the evangelical groups that 
dominated the backcountry.74 Such concessions worked to preserve the peace won largely 
through intimidation.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The differing interests of yeoman farmers and the militant coastal leaders had 
caused the backcountry to react to Drayton and Tennent’s tour with ambivalence. While 
some men felt so bitter towards the coastal elite that they took up arms in defense of royal 
government, the ambivalence most back-settlers displayed towards the impending 
revolution revealed that the vast majority of backcountry settlers wanted to be left to their 
private pursuits. However, the Whigs knew the danger of allowing loyalist militias to 
remain among the back-settlers. If the British invaded the colony, the Whigs faced a 
potential two-front war. Thus, the backcountry threat had to be neutralized. The Snow 
Campaign marked a watershed moment in the struggle for the backcountry. Loyalist 
militias were finally neutralized three months after the fall of royal government; the 
Whigs enjoyed uncontested rule by December 1775.
Despite their best efforts, loyalist militias failed to amass in numbers equal to the 
Whigs. As a result, men defected, unwilling to stand up against a numerically superior 
enemy. The events of 1775 brought a previously unknown degree of authority to the 
backcountry. Most men, because they were unwilling to risk their lives and property in 
opposing the Whigs, gravitated to the side that offered the most protection. In July 1775,
7' Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 82.
74 Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 54.
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loyalist forces threatened Whig authority in the backcountry, but by December the Whig 
government conducted business without opposition. By exiling Gov. William Campbell 
to Charleston Harbor, the Whigs, through the Council of Safety and Provincial Congress, 
gained control of the militia structure. Those opposed to the conduct of the Whigs were 
purged from the militia and their access to the supplies needed to challenge the Whigs 
was restricted, thereby putting loyalists on the defensive. Historian Don Higginbotham 
concisely articulated the importance of the militia to suppressing loyalist opposition when 
he wrote, ‘T he militia’s use of muscle guaranteed that the patriots would maintain control 
of the political and law enforcing machinery in every colony. Therefore, from a military 
point of view, [the] months [following Lexington and Concord] were quite likely the 
most crucial period of the Revolution.”75
But the suppression of dissent in the backcountry was not solely a consequence of 
the fall of royal government and patriot seizure of the reins of authority. Whig success 
owed a great deal to the nature of opposition. Those who took up arms against the Whigs 
may have had an ideological attachment to the crown; but when confronted with a 
numerically superior force, they laid down their arms and promised to live in peace under 
Whig rule, bringing into question the strength of their ideology. Others never even took 
up arms. In light of Drayton’s threats of seizure of property, incarceration, and economic 
marginalization, many back-settlers - whose exact numbers we will never know - 
acquiesced to Whig rule. Becoming a loyalist meant taking up arms against another 
armed body, without the protection of British troops. Becoming a Whig required an
75 Don Higginbotham, “The American Militia: A Traditional Institution with 
Revolutionary Responsibilities,” in Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected 
Essays (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 95.
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individual to perform militia duty, but with the support of the established authority and 
the security of superior numbers. In light of Whig ascendancy to power and use of 
intimidation tactics, for the average back-settler looking to continue his pre-war life, the 
Whigs offered a greater chance to pursue the status quo. Robert Cunningham, in a critical 
letter to Drayton, best emphasized the value back-settlers placed on protection and why 
the Whigs emerged from 1775 with a firm grip on the backcountry: “I expected you 
would have acted with more honor than taken the advantage of men (as I believe) half 
scared out of their senses at the sight of liberty caps and sound of cannon, as seeing and 
hearing has generally more influence on some men than reason.”76
76 Cunningham’s reply to Drayton, Oct. 5, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 200.
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CHAPTER III
THE INDIAN THREAT
The Whigs overcame the economic, political, and social differences between the 
backcountry and lowcountry that had produced conflicting interests and successfully 
subdued the backcountry largely through intimidation. But they did not win control of the 
backcountry on this issue alone. Though war with Britain may not have advanced the 
plight or status of the back-settlers, the Whigs were able to represent the best interests of 
the settlers by addressing a chronic backcountry problem: Indians. The close proximity of 
Indian nations bred constant fear among those living beyond the Piedmont. The scars of 
the Cherokee war of 1759-1761 ran deep; settlers demanded protection. The need to 
neutralize the Indian threat became a pivotal issue in determining the allegiance of the 
backcountry.
On May 3, 1775, a letter arrived in Charleston from Arthur Lee, a patriot who had 
been dispatched to London as a representative from Boston. The letter stated that “there 
is gone down to sheerness, seventy-eight thousand guns and bayonets to be sent to 
America to be put into the hands of N***** [negroes], the Roman Catholics, the Indians,
77 'T’and the Canadians; and all the. . . means on earth used to subdue the colonies.” The 
charge that the British planned to instigate a slave and Indian insurrection in the colonies
77 Robert A. Olwell, “’Domestik Enemies’: Slavery and Political Independence in South 
Carolina, May 1775-March 1776,” Journal o f Southern History 55, no. 1 (Feb. 1989), 30.
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was completely erroneous, but the letter provoked hysteria throughout South Carolina 
and provided the impetus for the formation of the Provincial Congress, which first met on 
June 1. Weeks later a rumor circulated throughout Charleston that Gov. William 
Campbell was aboard a sloop of war carrying 14,000 stands of arms to be used to arm the 
slaves and Indians.78 Alexander Innes, Lord Dartmouth’s secret agent in Charleston, 
reported that the letter “has raised a great ferment, and furnished the Committee with a 
pretext to mount a Guard of 100 men every evening, with a Patrol of Horsemen.” The 
Lee letter also provided the Provincial Congress with justification to raise 2,000 troops 
and issue thousands of pounds of paper money. The letter also led to the exile of John
79Stuart, the British Indian Superintendent for the Southern Department. Stuart’s deputy, 
Alexander Cameron, remained behind.
The Whig propaganda machine fully exploited the letter. John Stuart and 
Alexander Cameron had no desire to unleash the Indians on the southern colonies. They 
crafted a “defensive Indian policy” attempted to secure the allegiance of the Indians 
without involving them in the conflict. After Stuart fled the colony, his Charleston 
mansion and his wife were held hostage by the Whig government. Stuart expressed 
concern that the Whigs would use the Indians to influence his behavior: “My wife is 
detained in Charles Town, and has been insulted and threatened; and I have been 
acquainted by the Committee that my estate is to answer for the behavior of the 
Indians.”80 Stuart demonstrated remarkable transparency in order to prove he had no
78 Lord Governor William Campbell to Lord Dartmouth, August 31, 1775, in Davies,
Doc. ofAmer. Rev., 11:94.
79 “Charleston Loyalism in 1775,” 128; Olson, “Thomas Brown and the South Carolina 
Backcountry,” 44.
80 John Stuart to David Taitt, Aug. 29, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 159.
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nefarious intentions. In a July 18 letter to the Committee of Intelligence, Stuart stated, “I 
have never received any orders from my superiors, which by the most tortured 
construction could be interpreted to spirit up or employ the Indians to fall upon the 
frontier inhabitants, or to take part in the disputes between Great Britain and her 
colonies.”81
Stuart’s subsequent talks with the Indians revealed his desire to keep them out of 
the conflict. In a meeting with the Cherokees he declared, “There is a difference between
the people in England and the white people in America. This is a matter that does not
82concern you; they will decide it between themselves.” Stuart reiterated this point in a 
talk with the Creeks: “There is an unhappy dispute between the people of England and 
the white people of America, which, however, cannot affect you, as you can be supplied 
from Mobile, Pensacola, and this place, where the people live like brothers and enjoy 
peace; and it is not the intention of either party to hurt or molest you.”
Nevertheless, fears of an Indian attack persisted. The Whigs sent Major Andrew 
Williamson to meet with Alexander Cameron and interrogate him about a February letter 
written by Stuart that the Whigs interpreted as a plot to instigate the Indians. Williamson 
recorded notes of his conversation with Cameron in which the deputy Indian 
superintendent gave “the strongest assurances that he did not understand John Stuart’s 
letter to him in February to incite the Cherokee’s to attack the Province.” Cameron 
defended Stuart, asserting that he intended to keep the Indians “firmly attached to His 
Majesty’s government.” Cameron insisted that in the event of receiving such orders, he
O  I
John Stuart to Committee of Intelligence, July 18, 1775, in Extracts o f Letters 
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would ignore them in order to protect defenseless women and children. Cameron further 
added, “God forbid that he should be so void of humanity as to bring the Indians on this 
Province.”84
The Indians had good reason to remain loyal to the crown. The British had made 
an effort to slow westward expansion. Both Stuart and Cameron were full members of 
Indian society; Stuart had even fathered a few children by Cherokee women. Cameron 
had so much faith in the Cherokees, he wrote, “The Cherokees are the most faithful 
Indians on the main. They would die, all hands, in my defense.”85 Despite the strong 
attachment, Stuart struggled to control the Indians. Due to back-settlers’ encroachment on 
Indian hunting grounds, the Cherokees had unleashed a devastating war in 1759. 
Nonetheless, settlers continued to move west and often duped the Indians into selling 
their land. Stuart recognized the danger of these transactions: “You [the Cherokees] have 
been constantly told and admonished by me, not to treat or bargain for your land with any 
person but me.” The Cherokees had sold their land independently to Richard Pearis, a 
Whig Indian trader, who, Stuart warned, “cheats you of your land.”86 These land sales 
threatened to spark conflict between the Indians and settlers and to allow the Whigs to 
point to the attacks as a British conspiracy.
After evicting Stuart from the colony, the Whigs worked to undermine British 
relations with the Indians by dispatching agents of their own. George Galphin, a 
prominent Indian trader, was commissioned by the Continental Congress as an Indian
84 Andrew Williamson to Council of Safety, July 14, 1775, in “Journal of the Council of 
Safety for the Province of South Carolina,” Collections o f the South Carolina Historical 
Society 2 (1858), 56.
8:1 Alexander Cameron to Andrew McLean, Aug. 16, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 144.
86 Talk to Cherokees, in ibid., 160.
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superintendent and dispatched to the Creeks. The Whigs adopted a strategy of divide and 
conquer. The consequences of having all Indian tribes in the area unite against the 
colony were frightening. With Stuart and Cameron commanding the respect and 
admiration of the Cherokees and Creeks, their apprehension was reasonable. Stuart had 
stoked these fears when he settled a war between the Creeks and Choctaws in early 1776,
0 7
freeing up Creek forces for a potential attack on the colonies.
With these fears in mind, Galphin worked to wean the Creeks away from the 
British through gifts of gunpowder. He reported, “If we could supply the Creeks with 
ammunition and goods it would not be in Mr. Stuart’s power to influence them to act
00
against us.” Galphin was ultimately successful; when the loyalists attempted to send 
wagons of powder to the Cherokees, the Creeks refused to allow the convoy to pass 
through their territory.89
However, donations of powder to Indian nations, while it was in short supply in 
the colonies, nearly sparked a backlash from back-settlers. The Provincial Congress sent 
the Cherokees a gift of powder in November 1775, but en route a force led by Patrick 
Cunningham and Jacob Bowman, two loyalist leaders, intercepted the wagon train. 
Loyalists used the capture of the powder to their advantage, accusing the Whig 
government of fomenting an Indian attack against all those who opposed their rule. In 
response, Drayton composed a formal declaration explaining to the people of South
0 7
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Carolina the need to supply the Cherokees with powder. He defended the decision by 
arguing that:
Experience has taught us, that occasional presents to the Indians has been 
the great means of acquiring their friendship. . . .  it clearly and 
unfortunately appeared, that a general Indian war was inevitable, unless 
the Indians were furnished with some small supplies of ammunition, to 
enable them to procure deer skins for their support and maintenance.90
Drayton castigated some non-associators for making the issue of powder “an instrument
for their most diabolical purposes.” In attempts to appease other non-associators, Drayton
described the actions of the Whig government as “breathing equal benevolence to the
associators and non-associators in this Colony” by keeping the Indians at peace and
therefore providing universal protection. Though he acknowledged the scarcity of
gunpowder, Drayton argued that by giving the Indians a gift and keeping them at peace,
the colony would conserve gunpowder by avoiding a full-scale war. 91
Drayton’s reasoning had good effect. Although the Whig plot to sell powder to
the Indians had been exposed, settlers continued to remain distrustful of Alexander
Cameron, despite his efforts to promote Indian neutrality. Major Andrew Williamson
described the sentiment in the Ninety-Six district: “I was not a little surprised at my
arrival here to find the most material transactions of the Congress in the mouths of every
person, and to be told that there was an intention to seize Mr. Cameron, which occasioned
O'y
his going to the [Cherokee] Nation.” “ News of Cameron’s presence among the 
Cherokees did not help his efforts to convince the back-settlers that the British meant no 
harm. Drayton wrote to Cameron asking him to follow Stuart’s precedent by leaving the
90 Declaration by the Authority of Congress, November 19, 1775, in ibid., 211-213.
91 Ibid.
“ Andrew Williamson to Council of Safety, July 14, 1775, in “Council of Safety 
Journal,” 2:55.
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province; Cameron could not disobey the request “with safety to your person and the 
people m your charge.”
Suspicion over Cameron’s activities grew when the Whigs received an affidavit 
detailing alleged plans for an Indian attack. A patriot named Jonathan Clark testified that 
John Garwick, a close friend of Cameron, had warned him to flee to safety if troubles 
escalated between the colonists and the king’s army. Garwick told Clark of a meeting 
Cameron had with four hundred Cherokee in which he described how the rebels had 
killed the king’s troops at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. The Cherokee replied 
they would fight but complained of a lack of powder; Cameron assured them he would 
supply them with the necessary tools of war.94
Though Cameron and Stuart pursued a “defensive” Indian policy, other leading 
loyalists drew up plans designed to use Indians against the Whigs. Gov. Patrick Tonyn of 
East Florida, Thomas Brown, and Gen. Thomas Gage sought to crush the rebellion by 
enlisting the aid of Indians. On October 2, 1775, Gage wrote to John Stuart asking him 
“to make them [Indians] take Arms against His Majesty’s Enemies and to distress them 
all in their power, . . .  no time should be lost to distress a set of People so wantonly 
rebellious.”95 Stuart, however, disagreed. Before he received Gage’s orders, Stuart had 
written to the general stating “a great majority of the frontiers, and back inhabitants of 
Carolina are attached to and inclined to support government. In such circumstances, I 
conceive that an indiscriminate attack, by Indians, would be contrary to your 
Excellency’s idea, and might do much harm.” Though Stuart had no delusions of
9’ Mr. Drayton to Mr. Cameron, Sept. 26, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 195.
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bringing the entire Indian population down upon the back-settlers, given the increasingly 
stiff opposition posed by the Whigs, he did acquiesce (rather ambiguously) to disposing 
“them to join in executing any concerted plan, and to act with, and assist, their well 
disposed neighbors.”96
In the aftermath of the Snow Campaign, former loyalists were under intense Whig 
scrutiny. Thomas Brown believed that the only way loyalists would rise again was with 
the help of the Indians. Brown concocted a plan in which “trusted white men” would 
accompany the Indians during their attacks on small forts throughout the backcountry in 
order to distinguish between friend and foe. Brown hoped that by seizing these forts,
97loyalist and Indian forces would cut Whig supply lines to the backcountry.
At the end of February 1776, John Stuart left St. Augustine for Cape Fear, North 
Carolina to meet with Sir Henry Clinton to discuss a plan for using the Indians in the 
event of a British invasion. However, Stuart did not convey Brown’s militant plan to 
Clinton. A letter from Clinton to Governor Tonyn revealed that Stuart only told Clinton 
of another of Brown’s proposal to raise four companies of riflemen, not his plan to have
98Indians fight alongside loyalists. L
In the summer of 1776, the Whig government pre-empted any efforts by the 
British to enlist the Indians by sacking the Cherokees. Drayton gave specific orders to 
decimate the Cherokees:
And now a word to the wise. It is expected you make smooth work as you 
go -  that is, you cut up every Indian corn-field, and bum every Indian 
town -  and that every Indian taken shall be the slave and property of the 
taker; that the nation be extirpated, and the lands become the property of
96 Another letter from Stuart to Gage, Oct. 3, 1775 in Extracts o f Letters.
97 Olson. “Loyalists and the American Revolution,” 49-50.
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the public. For my part, I shall never give my voice for a peace with the 
Cherokee Nation upon any other terms than their removal beyond the
99mountains.
The demoralizing attack on the Cherokees intimidated other nations into staying out of 
the conflict. Major Andrew Williamson received word from George Galphin that “the 
Creeks are fully determined not to assist the Cherokees in the present war.” Williamson 
expressed hope that the attack on the Cherokees “will deter any other nation, or tribes of 
Indians,” from “disturbing the quiet of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, or this province 
for some time to come.” 100 By employing the resources of the government to eradicate 
the Indian threat, Drayton and his fellow Whigs helped to build public support for the 
revolutionary cause. The loyalist leadership had collapsed six months before the Whigs 
attacked the Cherokees. The Whigs already had a firm grasp on the backcountry because 
of their intimidation tactics, but neutralizing the Indians and opening up new lands for 
settlement asserted the pre-war interests of the back-settlers.
The British did more harm than good to their cause by drawing up plans to use 
Indians against the Whigs. During the summer of 1776, Cherokees killed loyalists 
without distinction, revealing the fallacy of Brown’s plan.101 John Stuart and Alexander 
Cameron may have had no intention of deploying the Indians against the Whig regime, 
but their intentions mattered not. Fear of Indian attack had existed since the Cherokee 
W ar of 1759 and was the number one issue on the minds of back-settlers. Cameron’s 
presence among the Cherokees was no doubt suspicious to those who had experienced 
the wrath of Indian attacks in the past. The Whigs were masterful propagandists; they
99 Mr. Drayton to Francis Salvador, July 24, 1776, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 2:29.
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exploited Arthur Lee’s letter to the fullest. The British provided no tangible evidence that
they were defending the backcountry from Indian attack. Conversely, the Whigs raised a
militia and took the war to the Indians, ensuring the protection of the back-settlers and
winning their favor in the process. The sentiment of back-settlers, and the crucial role
protection from Indian attack played in determining their allegiance was best described in
the account of Alexander Chesney. Although Chesney, a loyalist, was arrested by the
Whigs, imprisoned, forced to join the rebel army, and his house ransacked, and, he wrote,
“We marched against the Indians, to which I had no objection, helped to destroy 32 of
102their towns. . . .” [my emphasis].
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CONCLUSION
In December 1775, Lord George Germain wrote to Major General Henry Clinton, 
assistant to General William Howe, with encouraging news regarding the rebellion in the 
southern colonies. Germain announced that “The number of well-affected persons there 
who, unprepared to resist, have been compelled to submit to the violence of the times is 
certainly very great, and therefore there is the fairest prospect of that province being 
reduced to obedience without any considerable difficulty or hazard.. .” ‘ Little did 
Germain know that as his letter sailed across the Atlantic, the friends of government who 
had taken up arms against Whig oppression were in the process of being soundly defeated 
by Col. Richard Richardson and his army of 4,000-5,000 men in the Snow Campaign. 
Nevertheless, the British began to conceive of an assault on the southern colonies in 
hopes of using individuals loyal to the crown to crush the rebels.
In the early months of 1776, General Howe was preparing for a massive assault 
on New York City. The campaign to destroy the Continental Army in New York was the 
largest military engagement ever waged by the British military and required all available 
resources. Yet the British high command saw an opportunity to achieve victory on the 
cheap. Reports from the governors of Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia 
had communicated the expectation that the rebellion was the work of a minority and that
I 0T Lord George Germain to Major General Henry Clinton, Dec. 6, 1775 in Davies, Doc. 
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if aided by the British, loyalists would rise up and crush the Whig regimes. Over Howe’s 
opposition, General Clinton, accompanied by Admiral Sir Peter Parker, was dispatched to 
rendezvous with loyalists in the southern colonies, quickly establish royal government, 
and return in time for the assault on New York. The plan was flawed in its conception 
and tragic in its execution. As historian Paul Smith wrote in his study of British loyalist 
policy:
The plan clearly envisioned only token opposition by rebel forces. No 
allowance was made for the possibility that the loyalists might be 
intimidated and rendered ineffective, no provision was made for any rebel 
resurgence once the British regulars had been withdrawn, and no warrants 
were issued for raising regular provincial regiments for later use by the 
colonial governors.104
Clinton and Parker arrived at Cape Fear, North Carolina on March 12, 1776 only 
to learn that the friends of government that were so integral to their operation had been 
defeated at the Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge on February 27 after taking up arms 
prematurely. Their defeat had been the result of poor communication and choppy seas. 
Clinton’s ships had been delayed by winter storms and a detachment of troops sailing 
from Ireland never arrived. Without a chance to conquer North Carolina, Clinton turned 
his attention to South Carolina. Clinton had received intelligence that the loyalists were 
confined to the backcountry, but without the reinforcements from Ireland, Clinton was 
too short-handed to make an assault that would reach the backcountry. With his ships 
anchored outside of Charleston, Clinton devised a light naval assault on the city. Rather 
than sack the capital, he sought to seize Sullivan’s Island to create a temporary asylum 
for loyalists and royal officials “until the proper season for a southern American
104 Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy 
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campaign returned.” 105 Though the attack was not designed to overthrow the Whig 
regime, Clinton believed that a future southern campaign was inevitable and thus saw 
value in establishing a friendly outpost. Without providing details on how the outpost 
would be supplied or defended, Clinton commenced his attack. Three ships ran aground 
as they attempted to fire on Fort Moultrie and Clinton’s ground forces were unable to 
reach Sullivan’s island due to impassible terrain and heavy fire. The subsequent British 
retreat provided the Whigs with a resounding boost of morale.106
The British acted too late to save royal government in South Carolina. The Whig 
government’s use of intimidation and violence rooted out any staunch loyalist opposition
i
and sidelined thousands of potential supporters of the crown. While the need for such 
oppressive tactics demonstrates backcountry antagonism to the independence movement, 
becoming an active loyalist required individuals to pick up a musket and fight their 
fellow colonists. Without the protection of the British, few were willing to jeopardize 
their lives and property in a losing cause. Thomas Brown wrote, “The Reduction of this 
Province. . . we can easily at any time effect when ever your Lordship shall be pleased to 
give Orders for the Purpose but until the arrival of some Troops either in the Province of 
North Carolina or this to cause a Diversion in our Favor we are of Opinion it would be an 
Experiment rather too hazardous.” 107 Protection was a prerequisite for action.
Part of the problem the opponents of independence faced was a Jack of 
gunpowder. Governor Campbell acknowledged the futility of resistance when he noted,
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“as they [back-settlers] have neither proper arms nor ammunition it would be the greatest
1 08cruelty as well as the highest madness to expose them to the fury of the rebels.” 
Regardless of how much anger Drayton stirred up through his threats of burning houses 
and sacking property, opposition forces remained powerless against a Whig government 
in control of the colony’s militia and resources. In April 1775, men friendly to the Whig 
government raided numerous armories throughout Charleston and the lowcountry, seizing 
hundreds of weapons and thousands of pounds of powder. Lt. Gov. William Bull 
reported, “There is not now a pound of gunpowder in the public magazine.” Replacing 
the stolen powder was nearly impossible. Since the escalation of tensions between the 
colonists and the mother country, the king prohibited the exportation of gunpowder to the 
colonies. 109 But the Whigs managed to procure additional muskets and powder from 
French and Dutch smugglers. They also outfitted a number of privateer boats to raid 
British ships stationed in the harbor; by August 1775, they had stolen over twenty tons of 
powder.110
The lack of powder for the individual back-settler failed to stoke the fires of 
resistance. Moses Kirkland, a bitter enemy of Drayton and loyalist ring-leader, reported 
that “the backsettlers are two to one in number, more than the rebel party; they got some 
powder, but when it came to be divided, they had only two rounds a man.” 111 A 
numerical advantage in manpower was useless without enough powder. On November 
25, 1775, the Provincial Congress ordered one Edward Weyman to collect any
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gunpowder still in private hands and to deposit it in the public magazine, thereby 
centralizing it and removing it from loyalist reach.112 Following the Snow Campaign, the 
Whigs solidified their authority as the Provincial Congress resolved to disarm all those 
who “shall be active in opposing the measures of the Continental or Colony Congress.” 
Those who had fought against Col. Richard Richardson’s forces in the Snow Campaign 
were pardoned and were “allowed to trade as usual, except for arms and ammunition.” 
Only by convincing the committee of their loyalty to the American cause and through an
113oath could their arms be restored to them. Opposition to the Whig government led to 
disarmament. The consequences of disarmament were further amplified by the fact that 
the Indian threat did not subside until late 1776. Although no concrete evidence exists to 
prove that back-settlers signed the Association in order to keep their arms to defend 
themselves against the Cherokees and Creeks, the thought could not have been far from 
their minds.
Fear was the main reason unknown numbers of back-settlers signed the 
Association. But fear did not produce loyal subjects. Governor Campbell noted in a letter 
to Lord Dartmouth that “the boasted unanimity is notoriously false, very many who were 
obliged to sign the Association totally disapprove every measure they have taken, and if 
things come to the last extremity they will find themselves abandoned by numbers whom 
fear or interest reduced to join them.”114 One back-settler who reluctantly signed the 
Association attested, “I know many whose hearts revolted while they put their hands to it, 
and I have heard them declare that they submitted to this illegal power as they would to a
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highwayman who held a pistol to their breasts; some few, notwithstanding the terror held 
over their heads, when they signed it, added saving their allegiance to His Majesty.” 115 
Historian John Gordon argued in his military history of the Revolution in South Carolina 
that at the early stages of the war (1775-1776), both Whigs and loyalists displayed 
remarkable restraint on the battlefield. Despite all the threats and confrontations, only a 
handful of men died as a result of the tension between patriots and loyalists in 1775. 
However, when the British invaded in 1780, blood flowed in every town in the 
backcountry.116 Partisan warfare laid waste to the South Carolina backcountry as cowed 
associators and staunch non-associators (who had since been exiled from the colony) rose 
under the protection of British redcoats to seek both protection and revenge for their 
maltreatment. In the fog of war, as British troops failed to protect every neighborhood 
and as patriot militias roamed free, allegiances swayed with the wind. Young loyalists 
like Alexander Chesney joined the rebel army to “save my father’s family from
threatened ruin.” 117 The spirited Eliza Wilkinson, a young girl who witnessed the British
118occupation, wrote, “I fear principle governs few. Interest reigns predominant.” As 
historian Robert Lambert noted, many people in the backcountry tended to change 
loyalties three to four times during the war.119 Such vacillating proves that individuals 
were not loyal to a single ideology, but rather chose the side that offered the greatest
115 Narrative by George Millegen of his Experiences in South Carolina, in ibid., 11:110.
116 John Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 30.
117 “Journal of Alexander Chesney,” 6-7.
118 Eliza Wilkinson quoted in James Piecuch, “Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, 
Indians, Slaves, and the American Revolution in the Deep South, 1775-1782” (Ph.D. 
diss., Dept, of History, College of William & Mary, 2005), 266.
119 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 306.
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degree of protection. But one other factor that has not yet been considered is self-interest. 
As Eliza Wilkinson said, “Interest reigns predominant.”
The Whig government was not shy about using economic incentives to influence 
peoples’ allegiance. In an effort to undermine the authority of militia colonel Thomas
Fletchall, a man unfriendly to the patriots, the Council of Safety permitted open trade
120with FletchalTs men to try to lure them away from their commander. If trade did not 
work to bring FletchalTs men over to the patriots, the Whigs were not beneath purchasing 
their loyalty. Col. Richard Richardson, a prominent backcountry militia commander 
recommended that “If our present expedition should fail that is now detached, we shall 
yet have these principals, as money will often accomplish what force cannot.” 121 
While money served as motivation to join the rank and file, the promise of 
improved status through commissions attracted the local elite to the Whigs. In a letter to 
Henry Laurens, Thomas Fletchall affirmed the importance of officer commissions in 
determining the allegiance of men when he wrote, “As for my commissions, I care not 
who has them; a man that is to be bought by a commission is not worthy of one, although 
that is the price of many.” 122 Thomas Brown, the Georgian who had been beaten by a 
Whig mob, proclaimed, “A Profusion of Promises and Commissions were dealt out with 
a liberal hand together with some Bribes to procure a Subscription to the 
Association.” 123While the British also actively courted the local elite, the collapse of 
royal government hamstrung their efforts to match the incentives provided by the Whigs.
120 Drayton to Council of Safety, September 17, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 189
1“l Richardson to Laurens, December 22, 1775, in ibid., 243.
122 Fletchall to Laurens, July 24, 1775, in ibid., 124.
123 “Loyalist View of Drayton-Tennent-Hart Mission,” 18.
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When ideological fervor for independence did not draw individuals to the Whig camp, 
the prospect of improved social status did.
Enticing recruits with money and promises of greater clout within their 
communities does not always produce the most loyal soldiers, however. In August 1775, 
a mutiny occurred in the Whig militia. Drayton reported that “the men were in an uproar 
at the idea of a deduction of their pay, for they had in general been promised provisions
3 24above their pay, and they were determined to quit the camp this morning and disband.” 
Drayton quelled the mutiny by allowing the enlisted men to purchase surplus goods from 
local residents and by ordering their commander to construct higher quality huts for their 
shelter.125
Andrew Williamson accepted a commission as a major during 1775 and was well 
known within the backcountry for his efforts to neutralize the threat posed by loyalists 
and Indians. Yet, in 1780, after the fall of Charleston, Williamson took an oath of 
allegiance to the British in order to protect his property. He became known as the 
“Arnold” of Carolina.126 Williamson was not alone. Moses Kirkland, one of the most 
vehement loyalists who plagued Drayton throughout 1775, had received a commission 
from the Council of Safety earlier that year. In July, the Council of Safety dispatched 
Kirkland and Major James Mayson to Fort Charlotte to secure a supply of gunpowder, 
but Kirkland switched sides during the mission and delivered the powder to a group of 
loyalists at Ninety-Six. The consensus among scholars is that Kirkland acted out of 
jealousy; he was angered that he had been passed over for a major’s commission in favor
124 Drayton to Tennent, Aug. 7, 1775 in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 128-131.
125 Krawczynski, Drayton, 165.
126 “Journal of Alexander Chesney,” 40.
55
of M ayson.127 Later in the war, Kirkland nearly walked away from the cause when his
128rival, Robert Cunningham, was awarded the commission he desired. These blatant acts
of self-interest demonstrated a lack of ideological attachment.
* * * * * * * * * * *
In hindsight, the inability of the British to provide protection against the measures
of the Whig government in 1775 and 1776 destroyed any possibility of establishing royal
government in the southern colonies. As Sir Henry Clinton noted:
The alarm which was now excited among loyalists by the large 
detachments sent off from the army called forth my utmost exertions to 
ease their minds, by convincing them that a total evacuation of the British 
posts was not intended. For I readily saw that the very worst consequences 
were to be apprehended from such an idea laying hold of them. . . . Should 
they, therefore, happen to be shaken in the confidence they had of support 
from her [Great Britain], policy might point out to many of them the 
prudence of early making the best peace they could with the usurpers.
And, when that dangerous door was once opened, it was impossible to 
foretell where the defection might stop, or how soon the entire alienation
129of America might follow.
Clinton prophesized correctly. His 1776 attack on Sullivan’s Island failed to provide any 
assistance or protection for the backcountry friends of government. After neutralizing the 
loyalist opposition in the backcountry, the Whig government solidified its authority and 
won favor with many back-inhabitants by attacking and decimating the Cherokees, 
thereby opening up more land for settlement. The Whigs also pardoned any insurgents 
who had taken up arms against them as long as they promised to live in peace. The 
disestablishment of the Anglican Church and greater representation in the state assembly 
aided the Whigs in their efforts to maintain the peace among the back-settlers. These
127 Krawczynski, Drayton, 158.
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129 Willcox, Sir Henry Clinton ’s Narrative, 109.
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measures helped to dull the bitterness and animosity that had plagued the colony prior to 
independence. Men were permitted to return to their private pursuits.
The Whigs also took a hard-line approach to prevent future disturbances by 
exiling any remaining loyalists who refused to sign the Association with a guarantee of 
death if they ever returned. A sedition law promised to punish by death anyone who took 
“up arms with a hostile intent, and by force and violence, or by words, deeds or writing” 
tried to rally others, or communicated with or assisted the British in efforts to incite an 
Indian or slave rebellion.130 After 1775, back-settlers, as Clinton said, made “peace with 
the usurpers.” This “peace” undermined British efforts to rally the backcountry in 1780 
when the British failed yet again to provide back-settlers the protection they needed to 
declare their allegiance to the crown.
The struggle to control the backcountry in 1775 and the bloodbath that broke out 
in 1780 in South Carolina are all the more striking when compared to the experiences of 
back-settlers in Virginia. In terms of ethnic, religious, and economic factors, the Virginia 
backcountry had more in common with the South Carolina backcountry than in contrast. 
A plethora of ethnic groups settled in pockets throughout the Virginia Southside and 
Shenandoah Valley. Evangelicals threatened the established Anglican order. Neither 
backcountry cultivated staple crops and thus had similar social orders. Yet domestic strife 
and civil war did not plague Virginia. The reason for Virginia’s remarkable stability is 
political. From the beginning of settlement, the tidewater elite took steps to integrate the 
backcountry into the existing political structure. Backcountry counties like Lunenburg 
sent representatives to the House of Burgesses and enjoyed the benefits of having local
L'° Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 50.
57
131institutions of government such as the county court. In South Carolina, the back- 
inhabitants were left without essential government institutions and a political voice to 
rectify the problem. Following the Regulator movement, greater steps were taken to 
correct the neglect, but the backcountry remained a distinct society with interests that did 
not include revolution.
* * * * * * * * *
The South Carolina backcountry, like its neighboring backcountries in other colonies, 
did not possess a deferential social order. Even if it had, would it have had any influence 
on the events of 1775 and 1776? In a polarized society, drifting towards civil war, men 
act in their own self-interest. If scholars question the strength of deference in peacetime, 
they should reject outright the notion that men willingly deferred to their social superiors 
in wartime. Robert Cunningham, Moses Kirkland, Thomas Brown, and countless other 
prominent men in the South Carolina backcountry were respected by their neighbors. But 
when faced with loss of property, economic restrictions, incarceration, or even death - all 
threats to a man’s independence - most back-settlers opted for the course of least 
resistance. This course involved signing an Association. When threatened by militia and 
hostile Indians, the decision to acquiesce to Whig rule was simple and had little to do 
with deference. The case of John Champneys illustrates this point, Champneys had his 
property seized by the Whigs when he refused to muster for his local militia. He was 
taken into custody and jailed by the Whigs. As he slept one night, someone fired a
1,1 Richard Beeman, who published a case study of Lunenburg County, Virginia, wrote 
an excellent piece comparing the experiences of the Virginia and South Carolina 
backcountries entitled “The Political Response to Social Conflict in the Southern 
Backcountry: A Comparative View of Virginia and the Carolinas during the Revolution,” 
in Hoffman, An Uncivil War, 213-239.
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gunshot into his cell, narrowly missing him. Reflecting back on his experiences during 
the war, Champneys epitomized the sentiments of thousands of back-settlers and helped 
explain why the Whig government won control of the backcountry: “As protection and 
allegiance are inseparable, we are desirous to enjoy the protection of our country, and 
are satisfied to take the test of allegiance” [my emphasis].132
1,2 John Champneys, An account o f the sufferings and persecutions o f John Champneys, 
a native o f Charles-town, South Carolina; inflicted by order o f Congress, fo r  his refusal 
to take up arms in defense o f the arbitrary proceedings carried on by the rulers o f said 
place. Together with his protest, &c., (London, 1778).
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